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During the years 1963 and 1964, this writer read and analyzed
every case on civil defamation decided by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court since statehood and published in the West Reporters. The results
were presented in an article in the Tulsa Law Journal,I which gave the
reader "a survey and sometimes critical analysis of the law of libel and
slander in Oklahoma as such law is reflected in the Constitution, the
statutes, and the cases, leaving for a later article perhaps some sug-
gested and badly needed changes in our law of defamation. ' 2 The
present article in part fulfills that tentative promise, but its purposes go
beyond suggestions for change in the defamation law. As a result of
the United States Supreme Court decision in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan3 and decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court since 1964, the
current state of the law of defamation in Oklahoma must be reexam-
ined and updated.
In order to put the present Oklahoma law of defamation in proper
perspective, it is necessary to review briefly the law as it was before the
New York Times decision and to review the law as it is since that deci-
sion and since other significant cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court. Before 1964, the Court had stated on a number of oc-
casions that the constitutional freedoms of speech and press did not
protect libelous statements.4 The Court's attitude was summed up by
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; B.S., J.D., University of
Oklahoma; LL.M., New York University.
1. Hager, Civil Libel and Slander in Oklahoma, 2 TULSA L.J. 1 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Hager].
2. Id at 3.
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
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Chief Justice Hughes: "For whatever wrong the appellant has commit-
ted or may commit, by his publications, the State appropriately affords
both public and private redress by its libel laws."5
During this earlier period, most, if not all, of the states recognized
the so-called fair comment concept. However, the states were split on
whether fair comment protected a defendant for false statements of fact
made about a public official concerning that person's official conduct.
The majority of the states took the position that criticism of the acts
and conduct of public officials was privileged in the absence of malice
"provided that no false statements of fact had been made.' Oklahoma,
by statute, follows the majority view in part by providing that opinions
and criticism based on true statements of fact are privileged, although
no criticism which falsely imputes crime to a public official is pro-
tected.8 The minority view is well illustrated by a case in which the
defendant newspaper published an article which falsely accused the At-
torney General of Kansas of official misconduct in connection with a
school fund transaction.' The Kansas Supreme Court said, "If the oc-
casion be absolutely privileged, there can be no recovery. If it be con-
ditionally privileged, the plaintiff must prove malice, actual
evilmindedness, or fail."'" Thus, the majority position did not protect
false statements of fact at all, while the minority view protected them
only in the absence of malice.
The United States Supreme Court had the opportunity in 1941 to
decide the constitutional issue of whether the several states can limit
5. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
6. The doctrine of fair comment protected a person who drew inferences from certain facts
and made comments or gave opinions on any matter of public concern based on those facts. The
doctrine differed from a conditional privilege in that the latter protected a person making false
statements, whereas fair comment required any comments, statements, or inferences drawn to be
based upon true occurrences or situations.
7. See, e.g., Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893).
8. A privileged publication or communication is one made:
Third. By a fair and true report of any legislative or judicial or other proceeding
authorized by law, or anything said in the course thereof, and any and all expressions of
opinion in regar thereto, and criticisms thereon, and any and all criticisms upon the
official acts of any and all public officers, except where the matter stated of and concern-
ing the official act done, or of the officer, falsely imputes crime to the officer so criticized.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1443 (1971).
9. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908). This case was discussed with
approval by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
10. 78 Kan. at, -, 98 P. at 292. See also Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 203
N.W. 974 (1925), adopting the rule in Coleman.
1978]
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the privilege of fair comment" but left the issue undecided. 2 Finally,
in 1964, the Court faced the constitutional question squarely and held
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan'3 that a public official cannot re-
cover damages for a defamatory false statement regarding his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual mal-
ice. The Court defined actual malice in this context to mean either that
the defendant made the statement knowing it to be false or that he
made it in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. Three years later the
Court extended the rule to public figures.14
In 1971, the Court failed to reach a majority opinion on the consti-
tutional issue of the extent of protection afforded to defamation of pri-
vate citizens by a mass medium defendant. 5 However, three years
later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,16 the Court, in a 5-4 decision (Jus-
tice Blackmun concurring only to attain a "definitive ruling"), held that
as long as the several states do not impose liability without fault, they
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a
publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
person.
II. OKLAHOMA CASES
On the average the Oklahoma Supreme Court has decided about
one defamation case each year since 1964. Most of these cases are rela-
tively unimportant to the present update as they merely reiterate rules
concerning libel and slander which were left unaffected by the United
States Supreme Court decisions beginning in 1964. Therefore, the fol-
lowing discussion will focus primarily on the exceptions to the general
rules, as well as on some federal cases using Oklahoma law.
A. Partnersh4v as a Party Plaintiff
The issue of whether a partnership can sue in the partnership
name for libel which results in damage to the business reputation of the
association has not been expressly decided in Oklahoma. However, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has indicated in dicta that a suit by or on
behalf of the partnership may be brought for damages accruing to the
11. Schenectady Union Publishing Co. v. Sweeney, 316 U.S. 642, af9'g 121 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.
1941).
12. See Note, Tors: Defaming a Public Official, 2 TULSA L.J. 79 (1965).
13. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
14. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
15. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
16. 418 U.S. 323, 354 (1974).
[Vol. 14:40
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association as a result of a libel of the partnership. 17 Further support
for the idea that a partnership is a proper party plaintiff is found in the
language of the Oklahoma statutes dealing with actions brought by or
against a partnership following its dissolution.' As a result of these
developments in Oklahoma law, this writer has altered his earlier posi-
tion on this issue' 9 and is now of the opinion that a partnership should
be able to maintain an action if it is defamed.
B. Standard of Liability for a Private Person Plaintiff
The United States Supreme Court in Gertz2" permitted the states
to have a lesser standard for defamation of a private individual than
the standard required for defamation of public officals or of public
figures. In those states which have established negligence or something
less than knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth as the
standard for liability with regard to private individuals, a problem has
arisen in determining who is a public official or a public figure. The
Court could have avoided some of the difficulty, and thus produced a
more accurate analysis, by setting one standard of liability for public
officials and a second standard of liability for all other persons.2' Prior
17. In Layman v. Readers Digest Ass'n, 412 P.2d 192 (Okla. 1966), the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that a libel of a partnership did not libel an individual member of that legal entity. It
said, "Since a partnership is a separate legal entity, a libel of the partnership of Layman and Sons
is an entirely different thing from a libel of A.H. (Herb) Layman. For damages accruing to the
partnership a suit by or on behalf of the partnership might have been brought, but this was not
done." Id at 196.
18. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1082 (Supp. 1978) provides that "a partnership may sue and be sued
in its firm name." Some doubt may be cast on this statutory language as authoritative with regard
to whether a partnership can maintain an action in the name of the partnership for libel directed
against the business reputation of the association, because § 1082 is found in chapter 18, entitled
"Revivor of Actions," and because the section is entitled "Dissolved partnerships." In addition,
the rest of the quoted section deals with actions brought by or against a partnership following its
dissolution.
19. Whether a partnership has a cause of action for libel of the business association itself
is perhaps a moot question, as it would be a very rare instance where a libel damaged the
reputation of a partnership without also damaging the reputation of the individual part-
ners. In the latter instance the partners would sue as individuals as they would be the
real parties in interest.
As two writers have observed:
At common law, a partnership could neither sue nor be sued in the partnership
name. All members had to join as parties plaintiff and be named as parties defendant.
Oklahoma follows the common law in actions brought by the partnership (foot note
omitted).
. . . It is very doubtful, however, that a partnership could maintain an action for libel
directed against the business reputation of the association.
Hager, supra note 1, at 9-10.
20. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
21. Some support for this statement is found in Justice Brennan's dissent in Gertz, wherein he
said:
[T]he idea that certain "public" figures have voluntarily exposed their entire lives to
4
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to Gertz the Court had provided some guidelines as to who is a public
official:
It is clear, therefore, that the "public official" designation ap-
plies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of govern-
ment employees who have, or appear to the public to have,
substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of
governmental affairs. . . . Where a position in government
has such apparent importance that the public has an in-
dependent interest in the qualifications and performance of
the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in
the qualifications and performance of all government employ-
ees, . . . the New York Times malice standards apply.22
Illinois, in applying these guidelines to a nursing home licensed by
the state and having wards of the state as patients, held that one is a
public official if he is carrying out a function of government or is par-
ticipating in acts relating to matters in which the government has a
substantial interest.23 Other cases have held as public officials the man-
ager of a community center,24 a clerk of a county court,25 an ordinary,
off-duty policeman,26 a candidate for public office, 27 a member of a
student senate at a state university,28 an assistant dean and professor of
law at a state university law school,29 an architect involved in construc-
tion of a public building,30 and a school principal.3
The Court in Gertz added to its earlier guidelines as to who is a
public figure:
Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to be-
come a public figure through no purposeful action of his own,
public inspection, while private individuals have kept theirs carefully shrouded from
public view is, at best, a legal fiction. In any event, such a distinction could easily pro-
duce the paradoxical result of dampening discussion of issues of public or general con-
cern because they happen to involve private citizens while extending constitutional
encouragement to discussion of aspects of lives of "public figures" that are not in the
area of public or general concern.
418 U.S. at 364 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971)).
22. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85-86 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
23. Doctors Convalescent Center v. East Shores Newspapers, Inc., 104 111. App. 2d 271, 244
N.E.2d 373 (App. Ct. 1968).
24. Brown v. Kitterman, 443 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1969).
25. Theckston v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 100 NJ. Super. 452, 242 A.2d 629 (Super. Ct.
1968).
26. Gilligan v. King, 48 Misc. 2d 212, 264 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
27. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
28. Klahr v. Winterble, 4 Ariz. App. 158, 418 P.2d 404 (Ct. App. 1966).
29. Gallman v. Carnes, 254 Ark. 987, 497 S.W.2d 47 (1973).
30. Turley v. W.T.A.X., Inc., 94 Ill. App. 2d 377, 236 N.E.2d 778 (App. Ct. 1968).
31. Reaves v. Foster, 200 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1967).
[Vol. 14:40
5
Hager: Civil Libel and Slander in Oklahoma--An Update
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978
DEFAMATION
but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be
exceedingly rare. For the most part those who attain this sta-
tus have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of
society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and
influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes.
More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In
either event, they invite attention and comment.32
Dean Prosser applied the definition both to invasion of privacy and to
defamation:
A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate inter-
est in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a
"public personage." He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obvi-
ously to be included in this category are those who have
achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the
public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball
player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is, how-
ever, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous in-
ventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers,
an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Grand
Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who
has arrived at a position where public attention is focused
upon him as a person.3
3
The United States Supreme Court has had difficulty in applying its
own guidelines for a public figure. Its decision in Time, Inc. v.
Firestone34 appears to be factually inconsistent with the result in Gertz.
Mr. Gertz was an attorney representing a client in a civil action
brought against a policeman. He had served briefly as an appointive
city housing committee member, had long been active in community
and professional affairs, and had published several books and articles
on legal subjects. The Court held he was neither a public official nor a
public figure. Mr. Gertz's participation in the whole affair related
solely to his representation of a private client; he did not discuss the
litigation with the members of the press and was never quoted as hav-
ing done so. He did not thrust himself into the vortex of this public
32. 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
33. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 118, at 823-24 (4th ed. 1971) (foot-
notes omitted).
34. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
1978]
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 14 [1978], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol14/iss1/2
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:40
issue, nor did he attempt to influence its outcome by engaging the pub-
lic's attention. Mrs. Firestone stood in a different position. Although,
like Mr. Gertz, Mrs. Firestone's alleged defamation came about as a
result of having been engaged in civil litigation, she was an active
member of the "sporting set," a social group which does have especial
prominence in the affairs of society under the Court's test. Because of
her special social position, her life received constant media attention.
She held several press conferences in the course of her lawsuit. Never-
theless, the Court held her to be a private person in connection with the
alleged defamation." If the results in the two cases are inconsistent,
the Court's decision in Gertz is arguably more in keeping with its own
guidelines.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has had little opportunity to be-
come involved in this public figure, private figure dichotomy. In Mar-
tin v. Griffin Television, Inc.,6 the plaintiff Martin owned and operated
a commercial pet shop which offered pet grooming, sold pet supplies,
and sometimes purchased and sold pets. The court held the plaintiff to
be a private individual3 7 and compared his position to that of Mr.
Gertz in the Gertz decision. However, the plaintiff in Washington v.
World Publishing Co.38 did not fare so well and, because he had thrust
himself into a controversy of public interest, found himself declared a
public figure.39 Mr. Washington was the American Party's nominee for
35. "[R]espondent did not assume any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society
and she did not thrust herself to the forefront of any particular public controversy. . . ... 424
U.S. at 453.
36. 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976).
37. Here, Martin, as was Gertz, must be characterized as a private individual. Martin
was not a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts by achieving pervasive fame
and notoriety. He had not become a public figure for a particular issue by voluntarily
injecting himself into a particular public controversy; he had not thrust himself into the
vortex of a public issue nor attempt to engage the public's attention to influence the
outcome of a public issue. Martin was a private individual.
Id. at 89 (footnotes omitted).
38. 506 P.2d 913 (Okla. 1973).
39. Plaintiff's deposition shows the following: he had permitted the use of his law office
as the unofficial Tulsa County headquarters of the American Party; he had permitted the
use of his office address and telephone number in a newspaper ad soliciting funds for the
American Party's presidential candidate, George Wallace; plaintiff was the party's nomi-
nee for United States Senator from Oklahoma. In our opinion the trial court did not err,
in finding for the purposes of motion for summary judgment, that Washington was a
"public figure." Moreover, the public posture of the American Party both then and now
on issues of great public interest could hardly be said to be non-controversial. That
being true, and though there were no volatile or potentially volatile and imminent con-
frontations involved here as was the situation on the University of Mississippi campus
when General Walker appeared there, nonetheless, it might be said here as was argued
in the Walker case that Washington had thrust himself into the "vortex" of controversy
and his protection under the libel laws was, therefore, limited.
Id at 916.
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United States Senator and allowed his office and telephone number to
be used by the local unit of the National American Party, a highly con-
troversial political party. The public figure issue in the Martin and
Washington cases was not difficult to decide. The facts presented in
evidence made quite clear that, under the guidelines laid down by the
United States Supreme Court, Martin was a private figure and Wash-
ington was a public figure.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court had a more difficult time in decid-
ing that issue in the recent case of Johnston v. Corinthian Television
Corp.4" The plaintiff was a physical education teacher in the Skiatook,
Oklahoma, public schools and coached the grade school wrestling
team. The coaching activity was done within the framework of the
public school system, although that activity was entirely voluntary on
the plaintiff's part. The allegedly false defamatory statements were
contained in television newscasts and concerned certain activities that
were reported to have occurred in connection with the wrestling team
which the plaintiff coached. The trial judge granted the defendant's
motion for a summary judgment on the grounds that Johnston was
both a public official and a public figure, and that the defendant televi-
sion station had acted without actual malice under the New York Times
test. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the
plaintiff was a private person under facts analogous to the Martin deci-
sion and remanded to allow the trial court to apply the negligence test
established in Martin. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found the plain-
tiff to be a public official because the position of wrestling coach was of
importance in the Skiatook public school system and because the pub-
lic's interest in this coaching position went beyond the general interest
of the public in the performance of all government officials.41 The im-
40. 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla 1978).
41. In its unanimous opinion, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held:
Here, there must first be a determination as to whether Johnston shall be considered
a private or non-private person for the purpose of this defamation action. We find him
to be a non-private person based on his being a public official.
"A person may become a public official within contemplation of the New York
Times rule in either of two ways. First as that case itself illustrates, he may be an elected
official, and the alleged libel must relate to his official capacity. Second, as the Court
held in Rosenblatt v. B'aer, he may be a government employee with such responsibility
that the public has an independent interest in his position and performance, and the
alleged libel must relate to his official capacity."
Rosenblatt, supra, found a supervisor of a county ski resort, who was employed by
and directly responsible to county commissioners, to be a public official for federal con-
stitutional protection purposes. The opinion refused to accept as a definition of a "public
official" the understanding of the term for a local administrative purpose. Guidelines of
the term "public official" are contained in the decision: (1) "at the very least, to those
among the heirarchy [sicl of government employees who have, or appear to the public to
1978]
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portance of this decision in the development of the public official issue
nationally is in part indicated by the filing of amicus curiae briefs by
the National Newspaper Association and the Oklahoma Education As-
sociation.
In the recent case of Wright v. Haas,4 z the plaintiff had written a
letter to the editor which was published in the University of Oklahoma
newspaper. The defendant's letter was in response to that of the plain-
tiff and was published a few days after the plaintiff's letter appeared.
The court found the plaintiff to be a public figure because he had vol-
untarily sought publicity to influence public opinion,43 and it applied
the New York Times standard.
The Gertz case permitted the states to adopt a negligence standard
in defamation actions brought by private parties against media defend-
have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs
(emphasis added)", and (2) "(W)here a position in government has such apparent impor-
tance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance
of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and
performance of all government employees."
We apply the second standard to Johnston. His position as wrestling coach was of
apparent importance in that public school's athletic program for the public to have an
independent interest in Johnston's performance as to the method of disciplining a sixth
grade boy in conjunction with the grade school wrestling team. This interest went be-
yond the general interest as to the performance of "all government employees," as indi-
cated by the number of withdrawals of students by parents from Johnston's physical
education classes. Though the grade school coaching duties were voluntary, Johnston
was operating within the framework of the public school system, an obvious governmen-
tal function.
Basarich v. Rodeghero was a libel suit brought by high school teachers and coaches
against a "newsletter" publisher. That opinion deals with the same issue before this
court and reads, in part:
"Plaintiffs are public employees, hired by the school board and paid with public
funds. As coaches and teachers in a local high school they maintain highly responsible
positions in the community.
"Public school systems, their athletic programs, and those who run them are consis-
tent subjects of intense public interest and substantial publicity.
"Public school teachers and coaches, and the conduct of such teachers and coaches
and their policies, are of as much concern to the community as are other 'public officials'
and 'public figures.'
In present case, the conduct of a coach-teacher and his policies were as much a concern
to the community as any other "public official."
Though called a strained application by the Court of Appeals decision, we can think
of no higher community involvement touching more families and carrying more public
interest than the public school system. This includes the athletic program. Rosenblall,
supra, rejected a local understanding of "public official," with its first standard setting
forth a minimal deinition of that term.
Id. at 1102-03 (footnotes and citations omitted).
42. 586 P.2d 1093 (Okla. 1978).
43. "Wright voluntarily injected himself into the vortex of the public controversy by writing
his letter addressed to the editor with the intent it be published. Wright's letter sought to engage
the public's attention to influence public issues." Id at 1096.
9
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ants, but did not require it. The Colorado Supreme Court was the first
state after Gertz to pass on the question of what the standard should be.
In Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc.,' the court adopted the posi-
tion of the Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 45 plurality opinion and held
that when a defamatory statement has been published concerning one
who is neither a public official nor a public figure, but the matter in-
volved is of public or general concern, the publisher of the statement
will be liable to the person defamed if the publisher knew the statement
to be false or made the statement with reckless disregard of its truth or
falsity. If the matter is not one of public or general concern, the private
person plaintiff need prove only negligence. This bifurcated approach
obviously returns us to some troublesome issues. What is a matter of
public or general concern? Who decides the issue? Should the decision
be left to the media, as was largely true in earlier times? If so, who
judges the judges?
Kansas has adopted the negligence standard.46 The defendant
newspaper in that case reported falsely that the plaintiff had pleaded
guilty to a charge of cruelty to animals, specifically the starving of pigs.
The Kansas Supreme Court reasoned that the communication media
have a considerable impact on the life of the individual citizen in re-
porting judicial proceedings and that the media should be accountable
for its negligence in the exercise of that function.
A third permissible approach under Gertz is to apply the New York
Times test of actual malice to all private plaintiffs whether there are
issues of general or public concern. Oklahoma has decided to adopt
the same position as Kansas and to apply a negligence standard. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court said succinctly, "We conclude a reasonable
balance between the right of the news media and the right of the pri-
vate individual is best achieved by the negligence test."'47
C Malice in Defamation Cases
Malice is one of the most troublesome words in the legal lexicon
because its meaning is derived from the context in which it is used.
Nowhere is that statement more true than in defamation cases where
malice can be used in four different senses.
In the early law of defamation, malice, in the sense of spite or an
44. 538 P.2d 450 (Colo. 1975).
45. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
46. See Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975).
47. Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 92 (Okla. 1976).
1978]
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improper motive, had to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff. This
pleading of malice became a pure formality, and malice was implied by
law from an intentional publication of a defamatory character.48
Oklahoma, by statute and case decisions, appears to use malice in the
sense of spite or an improper motive. The statutory definition of libel
speaks of a malicious publication, which implies that the plaintiff must
show it as an element of his case.49 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
opinions on the issue of malice as an essential ingredient of the plain-
tiff's case are unclear.50 However, the apparent inconsistencies can be
synthesized into the rule that the plaintiff must allege malice to plead a
prima facie case, but he may prove this element and establish his prima
facie case by means of the legal implication of malice. Because the
allegation is purely a formality, it would be better to do away with any
requirement of pleading or proving malice in this initial sense of the
word. Moreover, this requirement would only apply in a defamation
action today to a private person plaintiff in a state, such as Oklahoma,
which has adopted negligence as the standard of liability for such per-
sons suing a media defendant.
Malice is used in another sense in the New York Times rule which
defines it as knowing a statement is false or acting in reckless disregard
of its truth or falsity. In one of the most important decisions concern-
ing defamation since the New York Times case, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional those sections of the
Oklahoma libel and slander statutes which created the presumption of
malice.51 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held in a 1973 case that a
48. But the pleading of "malice" tended more and more to become a pure formality,
until in 1825 it was held that "malice" would be implied by the law from an intentional
publication of a defamatory character, even though the defendant harbored no ill will
toward the plaintiff, and honestly believed what he said to be true. In any such sense as
this, "malice" becomes a bare fiction.
Veeder, The History and Theory ofthe Law of Defamation, 4 COLUM. L. Rav. 33, 35-37 (1904).
See also Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 41 L.Q. Rav. 13, 24-
26 (1925).
49. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1441 (1971).
50. See Harris v. Rich, 104 Okla. 120, 229 P. 1080 (1924), where the court said, "In all cases
of defamation, whether oral or written, malice is an essential ingredient, and must be averred. But
when averred, and the language, verbal or written is proved, the law will infer malice." Id. at 122,
229 P. at 1081. But see Craig v. Wright, 169 Okla. 245,43 P.2d 1017 (1934), where the court said,
'Malice is emphatically no part of a plaintiffs cause of action for libel." Id. at 247, 43 P.2d at
1019.
51. Resulting from the constitutional limitation imposed by the New York Times case,
supra, to public officials, by Curtis Pubishing Co. case, supra, to public figures, and now
extended to private individuals by Gertz, supra, we hold the legislative creation of pre-
sumed malice under the Oklahoma libel and slander statutes to be unconstitutional. We
find the following sections or portions thereof unconstitutional:
12 O.S.1971, § 1443 as to that part which provides:
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news reporter did not violate the New York Times rule of reckless dis-
regard of the truth or falsity of his statements by failing to advise the
public official plaintiff of the specific accusation to be made against him
in a newspaper article. 2 The court reasoned that this failure of the
reporter was not highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from reporting standards and, therefore, was not reckless dis-
regard of the accusation's truth or falsity. Later, in 1977, the court af-
firmed the trial court's judgment for the defendants on the ground that
the plaintiff, a police chief, had not proved actual malice against the
defendants, a television station and its news reporter. 3
The other two senses in which the word malice is used in defama-
tion cases relate to the plaintiffs attempt to overcome a conditional
privilege which is not governed by the New York Times rule, and the
attempt to recover punitive damages.
Brown v. Skaggs-Aibertson's Properties, Inc. 14 addressed the issue
of conditional privilege and involved a private person as the plaintiff
and a corporation as the defendant. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit, applying Oklahoma law, affirmed the lower
court's decision for the plaintiff and discussed the conditions under
"In all cases of publication of matter not privileged under this section, malice shall be
presumed from the publication, unless the fact and the testimony rebut the same."
12 O.S.1971, § 1444 as to that part which provides:
".... and the plaintiff to recover shall only be held to prove that the matter was published or
spoken by the defendant concerning the plaintiff." (Emphasis added).
12 O.S.1971, § 1445 which provides:
"An injurious publication is presumed to have been malicious if no justifiable motive for
making it is shown."
Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 90 (Okla. 1976). This holding was forecast earlier
by a law student who wrote: "A state law presumption of malice, such as that contained in sections
1443 and 1445, as well as the case law distinctions between statements of fact and opinion, appears
contrary to such a holding." Note, Libel and Slander. Constitutional Standards Challenge
Oklahoma Law, 26 OKLA. L. Rav. 94, 96 (1973).
52. Washington v. World Publishing Co., 506 P.2d 913 (Okla. 1973).
53. Henslee v. Monks, 571 P.2d 440 (Okla. 1977). The instruction on malice provided in part:
The burden of proof is on plaintiff to show by clear and convincing evidence that defam-
atory falsehoods were telecast or published about him with actual malice, and such
caused him injury and damage ....
By "actual malice" is not meant that either defendant bore him hatred or ill-will,
but that defamatory falsehoods were telecast about him either with actual knowledge of
their falsity, or with reckless disregard as to whether or not they were false.
"Reckless disregard" means an awareness of the probable falsity of defamatory
statements, or serious doubts as to the truthfulness of statements, in spite of which
awareness or doubt, the defamatory falsehood is published or telecast.
Id. at 444 n.6. The jury's verdict read:
The plaintiff has not proved defamatory falsehoods made with "actual malice" by clear
and convincing evidence, and our judgment is in favor of defendants against the plain-
tiff.
Id. at 444 n.5.
54. 563 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1977).
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which the defendant's conduct destroys a conditional privilege. The
court found a conditional privilege to exist when the communication is
made in discharge of a public or private duty, as in the instant case of
furtherance of legitimate business interests.
The court held that this privilege can be destroyed by the defend-
ant if the communication is made for purposes outside the privilege or
if it is made with malice. The court was willing to infer malice without
evidence of an intent to injure the plaintiff if there was an unreasonable
failure to investigate the truth of the communication. However, the
defendant's failure must go beyond negligence and rise to the level of
recklessness. 5
If the United States Supreme Court extends the Gertz reasoning to
all publishers, and not just to media publishers as was the fact in the
case, the conditional privilege will lose its significance in most states.
Gertz permitted a state to elect either a standard of negligence or the
actual malice standard of New York Times or something in between.
Both negligence of the defendant (under the majority view at common
law) and malice destroy the conditional privilege. Thus, proof by the
plaintiff of conduct required to overcome the constitutional standard of
malice will also serve to establish the abuse of the common law condi-
tional privilege.
In any event, whatever the fate of the conditional privilege may be
where a private person plaintiff sues a nonmedia defendant as in the
Brown case, a recent Oklahoma Court of Appeals decision 56 made
clear that conditional privilege is no longer a viable defense when a
private person sues a media defendant. In that case the plaintiff sued a
television station for defamatory broadcast. The Oklahoma Court of
Appeals afarmed the trial court's grant of the defendant's motion for a
summary judgment on the ground that reasonable minds, applying the
55. Communications, then, in furtherance of legitimate business interest are privileged,
but the privilege is qualified being subject to the communication being within the bounds
of the privilege. If it is made for purposes outside the privilege or with malice, the privi-
lege is lost.
. . . Malice in the sense of ill will and an express design to inflict injury was not
present, but it can consist of an unreasonable and wrongful act done intentionally, with-
out just cause. Malice may be inferred in the situation where the defendant has no rea-
sonable basis for believing that the statement is true. This would be the case where there
had been a failure to make an adequate investigation.
. . . Simple negligence would not, however, be enough to establish implied malice.
It must rise to the level of recklessness.
Id. at 986 (citations omitted).
56. Benson v. Griffin Television, Inc., 49 OKLA. B.A.J. 1150 (June, 1978).
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standard of ordinary care for the business of television broadcasting,
could not reach a conclusion other than that the defendant had exer-
cised due care. The defendant station argued that a conditional privi-
lege exists for the news media as long as the falsehoods were published
or broadcast in good faith about news events, because such a publica-
tion fulfills a moral or social duty. The plaintiff argued that the negli-
gence standard adopted in the Martin case precluded any conditional
privilege.
The court reaffirmed the negligence standard adopted in Martin
when a private party sues a media defendant. The court rejected the
establishment of a conditional privilege which could only be destroyed
by proof of malice. There is no conditional privilege for a media de-
fendant; it will be liable if it fails to exercise that degree of care which is
used by reasonably prudent persons engaged in media dissemination of
news.
57
The final sense in which malice is used in defamation cases occurs
in an attempt to recover punitive damages. This aspect of malice will
be discussed hereafter when other types of damages are considered.
Let it suffice for the moment to note that the Court in the Brown58 case
57. The Kansas cases have established a common law qualified privilege for the news
media based on the lengthy analysis in Coleman . MacLennan, supra. As stated in
Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., a post-Gertz case, "[e]ven though a statement com-
plained of be false, if it is qualifiedly privileged, it must be made with malice before it is
actionable." The effect of the qualified privilege in Kansas is to rebut the common law
inference of malice based only on falsity. Since malice is not required for a private
person to recover under Martin the effect of the adoption of the Kansas position, when
combined with Martin, is to convert the qualified privilege into an absolute defense un-
less the private plaintiff can plead and show malice or reckless disregard for the truth.
The consequence is to place on the private plaintiff the same burden shouldered by a
public official under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
The Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts (A.L.I. 1977) supports the balancing
process developed by Martin. See §§ 594 and 595. In an identical comment to these two
sections the drafters remark as follows on the effect of Gertz on the conditional or quali-
fied privilege:
Another significant consequence of all of this is that the courts will now find it
necessary to reassess the circumstances under which it is appropriate to grant a condi-
tional privilege. If a proper adjustment of the conflicting interests of the parties indicate
that a publisher should be held liable for failure to use due care to determine the truth of
the communication before publishing it, a conditional privilege is not needed and should
not now be held to apply. The conditional privilege should be confined to a situation
where the court feels that it is appropriate to hold the publisher liable only in case he
knew of the falsity or acted in reckless disregard of it.
49 OK.A. B.A.J. at 1151 (June, 1978) (citations omitted).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed this position by stating, "We hold there is no longer
a 'conditional privilege' available, either by statute or common law, as a defense to a public defa-
mation plaintiff." Wright v. Haas, 586 P.2d 1093, 1097 (1978). The case is interesting also in that
the plaintiff, a public figure, sued the defendant for alleged defamation via a newspaper without
joining the newspaper as a defendant.
58. 563 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1977).
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held that the defendant's act must rise to the level of recklessness to
destroy a conditional privilege on the grounds of malice and that the
same standard would apply to the award of punitive damages. 59
D. Truth as a Defense
Assuming that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie
case, the defendant may escape liability by establishing that
what was communicated was true. . . .Truth is a complete
defense if the defendant can show that the imputation is sub-
stantially true. Generally, the defendant need not show the
literal truth but must establish that what was communicated
was basically true as to the "sting" of the libel. Truth is gen-
erally a total defense regardless of the motives.60
In his earlier article, the author, because of the equivocal language
of the Oklahoma Constitution, the statutes, and the case decisions, ex-
pressed some doubt whether Oklahoma regarded truth as a total de-
fense regardless of the motives of a defendant. The Oklahoma
authorities seemed to require the defense of truth to be coupled with
good motives and justifiable ends, that is, under circumstances that
would make the communication privileged. The author speculated that
the rule in Oklahoma, although not clearly enunciated, was that truth
alone, without good motives or justifiable ends, is an absolute de-
fense.6' This speculation has proved to be true. In Hetherington v. Grqf-
fin Television, Inc.,62 the court said, "Contrary to the defendant's
assertion, truth is an affirmative defense. The burden of proving truth
rests upon the defendant."63 The inference to be drawn from the
court's opinion is that the defendant must prove the truth of its state-
ment, and, when it has done so, it has a valid defense. The
Hetherington decision followed one by the Oklahoma Supreme Court
in which Justice Lavender, speaking for the court, upheld the trial
court's instruction to the jury on truth which read in part:
The first issue for you to determine in this case is whether
the statements about the plaintiff contained in plaintiffs ex-
hibit nine (9) are true or false. The defendant has the burden
of proof on this issue and if you find said statements are true
then it will not be necessary for you to consider the remaining
59. Id. at 987.
60. Yasser, Defamation AsA Constitutional Tort: With Malice For All, 12 TULSA L.J. 601, 606
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Yasser].
61. Hager, supra note 1, at 19-22.
62. 430 F. Supp. 493 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
63. Id. at 498.
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issues in this case and you must return a verdict for the de-
fendant.64
Seemingly, the court felt constrained to hold as it did because of certain
statutory provisions which state that the defendant has the burden of
proving that defamatory statements made by it against the plaintiff are
true.65
As the Martin case 66 involved a private individual suing a media
defendant and adopted a negligence test as a standard of liability, 67 the
decision based upon the statutes seems a correct one because the New
York Times test of actual malice was not involved. However, it is sub-
mitted that in any case which requires the application of the New York
Times standard of liability (plaintiff public official, plaintiff public
figure, or plaintiff private person seeking presumed or punitive dam-
ages),68 the Oklahoma statutes are inapplicable, and truth ceases to be
an affirmative defense. On the contrary, proving the alleged defama-
tory communication to be false will become an essential part of the
plaintiff's allegations and proof. No United States Supreme Court case
specifically so holds. But if a plaintiff must meet the New York Times
standard of showing that the defendant either knew its statement was
false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity, inferentially
64. Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 94 (Okla. 1976).
65. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 304 (1971) provides: "In the actions mentioned in the last section,
the defendant may allege the truth of the matter charged as defamatory, and may prove the same,
and any mitigating circumstances, to reduce the amount of damages, or he may prove either."
Section 1444 provides in part: "As a defense thereto the defendant may deny and offer evidence to
disprove the charges made, or he may prove that the matter charged as defamatory was true."
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 1444 (1971).
66. 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976).
67. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
68. The author will not discuss in this article the question of whether a plaintiff must plead
the category into which he falls, or whether a defendant would raise the issue (where the plaintiff
considers himself to be a private person). In a recent case, a federal court tangentially touched on
this issue when it said:
The elements of the plaintiff's case involve showing what the defamatory matter was,
that it was broadcast, published or spoken of the plaintiff, the failure of the broadcaster
to exercise ordinary care and that damage flowed from the defamatory broadcast. Addi-
tionally, the plaintiff's case would include the showing of actual malice in support of any
effort to recover presumed damages or punitive damages.
Hetherington v. Griffin Television, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 493, 498 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (citations omit-
ted). The case, however, clearly involved a private person suing a media defendant.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court touched briefly on the matter when it said:
It is not plead [sic] in plaintiff's amended petition that he was or was not a "public
figure" as that term is defined in Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, supra. But the
admission by Washington that he was, at the time of publication of the news article in
question, in fact, such a figure seems tacitly implied from the language in the first sen-
tence in the last paragraph of the amended petition just preceding the prayer which
reads: That defendant published said article with actual malice, that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Washington v. World Publishing Co., 506 P.2d 913, 915 (Okla. 1973).
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the plaintiff must prove that the statement was false. In such a situa-
tion where the New York Times standard is required, the affirmative
defense of truth has now become a part of the plaintiff's prima facie
case.
. Per Se Defamation
The problem of what kind of damages can or must be pleaded,
and the per quod/per se dichotomy have, from very early times, been
inextricably and unfortunately tied together in a seemingly insolvable
Gordian knot. The United States Supreme Court could prove to be the
modem day Alexander the Great in severing this knot. Slander per
quod at common law required proof of special damages; slander per se
did not.69 The common law courts distinguished between the two kinds
of slander (unlike the distinction between the two kinds of libel, dis-
cussed hereafter) merely as a procedural matter having to do with what
kind of damages a plaintiff could or must plead. The reasoning was
that, if a plaintiff suffered a slander per se, there must have been some
damage to his reputation because of the seriousness of the slander, and
the court will presume it even though the plaintiff was unable to plead
any actual injury or to prove it by direct evidence.
No Oklahoma statute70 defines slander per se, and doubt was cast
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Findley v. Wison71 on whether
Oklahoma agrees substantially with its common law definition. In
69. Slander is actionable per se only if the slanderer says that the plaintiff: (1) committed
a crime of moral turpitude; or (2) has veneral disease or something equally loathsome or
communicable; or (3) is somehow unfit or not to be trusted in her occupation; or (4) is
not chaste.
Yasser, supra note 60, at 605.
70. OKCLA. STAT tit. 12, § 1442 (1971) provides:
Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, other than libel, which:
L Charges any person with crime, or with having been indicted, convicted or pun-
ished for crime.
2. Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, contagious or loathsome
disease.
3. Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession, trade or business,
either by imputing to him general disqualification in those respects which the office or
other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to his
office, profession, trade or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profit.
4. Imputes to him impotence or want of chastity; or,
5. Which, by natural consequences, causes actual damages.
Any first year law student will recognize that the first four of these instances listed, with
certain changes, are merely declaratory of what finally came to be slander per se at common law.
With this knowledge of what constituted slander per se at common law, a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the statute would be that the legislature intended the first four paragraphs to constitute
slander per se and thus actionable without allegation and proof of special damages, and intended
that actual damages must be alleged and proved in the situation in paragraph five.
71. 115 Okla. 280, 242 P. 565 (1926).
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Findley the court defined slander per se as meaning taken alone, in
itself, or by itself; and held that words which expose a person to public
hatred, contempt, or obloquy, or tend to deprive him of public confi-
dence, or injure him in his occupation are slanderous per se. The court
in that case did not have occasion to decide whether the following hy-
pothetical facts would constitute slander per se: plaintiff is defamed
orally which clearly is slander; he neither alleges nor proves special
damages; the defamation is plain and unambiguous (the usual test for
libel per se), but the slander does not fall within one of the first four
instances listed in the Oklahoma statutory definition of slander.72 An
Oklahoma Court of Appeals case addressed the same situation posed
by the hypothetical facts, and the court held that, although the slander
was defamatory on its face and plain and unambiguous, the plaintiff
did not show slander per se because he did not show any of the four
common law instances of slander per se, as listed in the statute.73
As opposed to slander, all libel was actionable at common law
without the necessity of pleading and proving special damages.74 The
distinction made between libel per se and libel per quod at common
law determined whether the plaintiff had to plead colloquium, induce-
ment, or innuendo. Colloquium was the pleading of facts to show
why the libel was defamatory of the particular plaintiff when the plain-
tiff was not identified specifically in the publication. Inducement was
the pleading of facts to show why the publication was libelous when the
defamatory meaning could be established only by reference to facts not
apparent upon the face of the publication. Innuendo was the pleading
of facts necessary to show the defamatory meaning of a word or phrase
which was slang or was capable of either an innocent or a defamatory
meaning. However, several states, including Oklahoma, began to
change the common law so that a libel per quod, like a slander per
quod, required allegation and proof of special damages. In a 1973 case
72. OKLA. STAT tit. 12, § 1442 (1971). See note 70 supra.
73. The words said to have been spoken by defendant's agent were, we think, defama-
tory on their face in that they have a clear tendency to injure plaintiff's reputation. By
natural import they diminish the esteem, respect, and confidence in which she is held by
others. This would, had the publication been written, be actionable without proof of
damages.
But it was not written and so-because they neither charge a crime, impute disease
or sexual irregularity, nor tend to injure plaintiff in respect to any known office or call-
ing-it matters not how grossly defamatory or insulting the words may be they are ac-
tionable only upon proof of "special damages."
Standifer v. Val Gene Management Servs., Inc., 527 P.2d 28, 31 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974).
74. The Restatement (Second) of Torts has adopted this view of the common law. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (1977).
75. See Yasser, supra note 60, at 605 n.25 for a good discussion of this point.
1978]
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the Oklahoma Supreme Court made clear that a writing not libelous
per se was not actionable without an allegation of special damages.76
'The distinction between libel per se and libel per quod introduces into
the law of libel complications unparallelled in the law of slander."'77
The complications arise in part because the various states do not agree
upon the test for libel per se. Is it libel per se when a plaintiff is not
identified specifically in the libel?-when the libel is plain on its face
without the necessity of pleading inducement or innuendo, but the libel
does not meet one of the categories of slander per se?-when the libel
meets one of the categories of slander per se but is not plain on its face?
Oklahoma follows the common law in regarding a libel as per se
and dispensing with the necessity of pleading and proving special dam-
ages only when it is not necessary to plead and prove extrinsic facts or
interpretations to establish the defamatory meaning. Unlike some
other states, however, Oklahoma does not require that the plaintiff be
named or otherwise identified in the publication for the communica-
tion to be libelous per se. Whether an article is a libel per se and
whether it has application to a particular party plaintiff are entirely
distinct questions.7 8 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has not had to de-
cide whether special damages must be proved if the libel is shown by
extrinsic facts to fall into one of the four classes of slander per se. 79 A
federal court, presumably using Oklahoma law, did touch on the issue
when it said:
In support of its connection that the evidence is insuffi-
cient to support the award of money damages, general and
special, appellant contends that the most that was proven was
76. "The established rule for determining the validity of a petition in a libel suit is that where
a writing is not libelous per se, recovery is dependent on allegation of special damages." Haynes
v. Alverno Heights Hosp., 515 P.2d 568, 569 (Okla. 1973). This had been the "established rule" in
Oklahoma for some time. See Hager, supra note I, at 16-17.
77. C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS IN TORTS 1013 (3d ed.
1977).
78. Whether an article is of a libelous character per se, and whether it has application to
a particular party plaintiff, are entirely distinct questions, and should not be confused.
The answer to the first question is to be found in the article itself. The answer to the
second question is to be found in the proof supporting proper allegations in the com-
plaint. Those proofs may consist of either the article itself, or of extrinsic evidence.
Fawcett Publications, Inc., v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 50 (Okla. 1962) (quoting from National Ref.
Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 20 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1927)) (emphasis added).
79. "An exception to the libel per quod rule is that if the statement could have been slander
per se if spoken, proof of special damages is not required." J. HENDERSON, JR. & R. PEARSON,
THE TORTS PROCESS 843 (1975). "Libel per quod, however can be magically transformed to libel
per se if it turns out that the defamatory statement as illuminated by extrinsic facts falls within one
of the four classes of slander actionable per se." Yasser, supra note 60, at 606. For the four classes
of slander per se, see notes 69-70 supra.
[Vol. 14:40
19
Hager: Civil Libel and Slander in Oklahoma--An Update
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978
DEFAMATION
libel per quod so as to require proof of special damages. As
we have pointed out above, the defamation in suit imputed
the commission of a crime; so even if it were to be regarded as
libel per quod, the exception applicable in a slander case, and
cases imputing the commission of an offense would apply and
would support the plaintiff's claims for general damges.80
F Damages
If a plaintiff has a case of defamation per se, whether libel or slan-
der, and therefore does not have to plead and prove special damages,
he may nevertheless do so if he has suffered such damages. Punitive
damages are not limited to cases of defamation per se. These two state-
ments are borne out in a federal court opinion in Oklahoma where the
court held that one who is liable for per se defamation is liable for both
general and special damages, and that punitive damages may be recov-
ered in cases of defamation per quod.8 t
The United States Supreme Court could do away with the trouble-
some per se/per quod dichotomy by either of two extreme measures. It
could follow the view of Justice Black 82 and hold the first amendment
freedoms of speech and press to be absolute. Under this position, all
defamation actions, civil and criminal, would be unconstitutional and
would disappear from our legal system. Alternatively, the Court could
hold that in every defamation action, regardless of the status of the
plaintiff or the defendant, the plaintiff must prove actual malice as de-
fined in the New York Times case.83 The Supreme Court is not likely to
take either position. The exact constitutional status of damages and the
80. Brown v. Skaggs-Albertson's Properties, Inc., 563 F.2d 983, 988 (10th Cir. 1977) (empha-
sis in original).
81. It is settled law that one who is liable for a per se libel or slander is liable for both
general and special damages. General damages are defined as all actual damages which
naturally and necessarily flow from the wrongful act. Special damages, on the other
hand, are actual damages which naturally, but not necessarily, flow from the wrongful
act.
o [Tlimely objections were made to instructions on punitive damages, apparently
on t theeory that punitive damages are not recoverable for defamations not actionable
per se ... We have found no case or comment to the effect that punitive damages are
not recoverable in defamations per quod in the discretion of the jury based upon a
specific finding of malice and special damages.
M.F. Patterson Dental Supply Co. v. Wadley, 401 F.2d 167, 172-73 (10th Cir. 1968) (citations
omitted).
82. Black, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes' A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 557, 558 (1962).
83. See Yasser, supra note 60, at 625-26, arguing for this approach.
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per. se/per quod dichotomy today is not clear. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts provides:
Although special damages need not be proved if the com-
munication is actionable per se, the Constitution is now held
by the Supreme Court to require proof of "actual injury" to
the plaintiff, at least if the defendant did not have knowledge
of the falsity of the statement or act in reckless disregard as to
its truth. The constitutionality of the common law rule that
nominal damages may be recovered for a defamatory com-
munication that is actionable per se, even in the absence of
proof of harm to reputation, is now somewhat uncertain. 84
An Oklahoma statute85 which did not deal with nominal damages
as in the Restatement above, but which did provide for a minimum
judgment of not less than one hundred dollars with no proof as to loss
or damage was held unconstitutional by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court.86 This holding is arguably correct because the statute was so
broad as to include all defamation cases. And certainly the decision is
correct as applied to the facts in the case. There the plaintiff was a
private person suing a media defendant and was required only to prove
negligence, whereas "Gertz constitutionally requires the New York
Times standard of actual malice where the defamed party is a private
person for the recovery of presumed damages."87 Could not the stat-
ute, however, be constitutional as applied to all situations not governed
by the decision in Gertz, such as a private person plaintiff suing a pri-
vate person defendant who has not used the media for his defamatory
statements? "[A]pparently in defamation actions against the media
tried pursuant to the New York Times Co. standard, presumed and pu-
nitive damages might still be awarded."88 If presumed damages are to
be allowed at all, may not a legislature establish a small minimum for
such presumed damages?
III. OKLAHOMA STATUTES
Most tort actions in Oklahoma, as elsewhere, are creatures of the
common law and thus are not governed by statutes. However, this is
not true of libel and slander in Oklahoma because these actions are
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569, comment C. (1977).
85. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1446 (1971).
86. Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976).
87. Id. at 93.
88, H. ZUCKMAN & M. GAYNES, MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW 73 (1977).
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authorized and regulated by specific statutes.8 9 These statutes are con-
fusing and rife with unanswered questions. One source of confusion is
that the statutory language defining civil libel is exactly the same lan-
guage used to define criminal libel.9"
Whatever may have been the motive of the Legislature in
making the criminal and civil definitions of libel identical, the
definition supra has created troublesome problems for the
trial and appellate courts, some of which problems the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has resolved to the satisfaction of
no one, unless it be a winning party. Inherent in the defini-
tion are other problems which continue to disturb law stu-
dents, law professors, attorneys, trial judges, and perhaps even
Supreme Court justices who may one day be called upon for
definitive resolutions of problems inherent in the statutes. 91
Since that statement was made, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
had to make some definitive resolutions of problems inherent in the
statutes, primarily because of the New York Times case and its prog-
eny. The sections concerning a presumption of malice have been de-
clared unconstitutional. 2 The section concerning what a plaintiff must
prove to establish a prima facie case has also been declared unconstitu-
tional.93 The statute providing for a minimum judgment in favor of a
successful plaintiff also has been struck down.94 Thus, the effectiveness
and validity of the statutory regulation of defamation seems certain to
continue to be called into question.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Oklahoma Legislature has several options regarding the stat-
utes on libel and slander. It can (1) do nothing; or (2) repeal all the
statutes, leaving to the Oklahoma judiciary the task of developing the
law of defamation as new cases are decided by the United States
Supreme Court and as new problems develop; or (3) revise the statutes
soon to reflect the decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court declaring
certain sections or portions thereof unconstitutional; or (4) wait to re-
89. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1441-1447.5 (1971).
90. Compare OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1441 (1971) with OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 771 (1971).
91. Hager, supra note 1, at 3..
92. See note 51 supra and accompanying text. See also OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1443, 1445
(1971); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976).
93. See note 51 supra and accompanying text. See also OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1444 (1971);
Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976).
94. See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text. See also OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1446 (1971);
Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976).
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vise the statutes until certain questions left unanswered by the United
States Supreme Court have been addressed by that body. This writer
expects that the legislature will choose to do nothing at this point,
which does not imply criticism of the legislature. In its relatively short
annual sessions, it has many pressing problems, and there seems to be
no large constituency pressing for reform of the defamation statutes.
The preferable legislative choice would be to repeal all statutes
relating to defamation and to leave to the Oklahoma courts the task of
developing a cohesive, fair body of defamation law. The many areas of
the law of torts do not lend themselves as well to codification as do
some other fields of law. The Oklahoma Legislature seems to have rec-
ognized the general truth of that statement because defamation is one
of the few areas of tort law regulated by statute.95 Further, under the
statutory title "Torts," 96 there are fewer sections than under almost any
other title in the entire body of Oklahoma's statutory law. There have
been many profound changes in the law of civil libel and slander in
Oklahoma since 1964. Many other changes will be forthcoming, either
as a result of United States Supreme Court decisions or as a result of
decisions from what this writer considers to be an excellent Oklahoma
Supreme Court.
95. Another notable exception is misrepresentation or deceit. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, §§ 2-4
(1971).
96. OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, §§ 1-22 (1971).
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